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ESSAY
Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding:
A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal
Scholarship
MARC A. FAJER*
Two recent law review articles, one by Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry' and the other by Mark Tushnet, / critique the use of outsider
narratives in legal scholarship. Both claim to be sympathetic critiques, yet
both reach conclusions that are quite critical of the authors whose work
they survey. Both raise two important concerns common to much criticism
of narrative scholarship. The first is the question of authority: Why are
these stories important enough for readers/listeners to take seriously? The
second is the question of credibility: Why should we believe these stories
are true?
In their critiques, Farber, Sherry, and Tushnet, like other critics of
narrative, fail to consider that outsider narratives do not take place in a
vacuum. When members of traditionally disadvantaged groups tell stories
about their lives, they do so against a highly textured background of
existing stories. Stories about what it means to be African-American, to be
a woman, or to be gay, for example, inform, to a greater or lesser extent,
the beliefs of everyone in society. Yet, these stories often differ dramati-
cally from the lived experiences of members of outsider groups. The
existence of these background stories, which elsewhere I have called
pre-understanding,3 both necessitates and complicates the presentation of
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law. The author wishes to thank Jane Baron,
Bill Eskridge, Michael Fischl, Lisa Iglesias, Christine Littleton, and Steve Schnably for
helpful comments on earlier drafts and Wylie Allen and Marnie Mahoney for thoughtful
discussion and moral support. Raquel Libman and Paul Ranis provided helpful research
assistance. In addition, the author particularly wishes to thank Mark Tushnet, who gener-
ously provided a detailed critique of an earlier draft.
1. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
2. Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992).
3. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 524 &
n.65 (1992) (explaining that because of pre-understanding, advocates never operate on a
clean slate). Gerald Lopez has used the term "stock stories" to identify these beliefs. See
Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (1984). I discovered the term
"pre-understanding" in Anthony Alfieri's work on poverty law, in which he uses it to
describe the set of beliefs lawyers may have about their clients before actually hearing the
clients' stories. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons
of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2123-24 (1991).
1845
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
outsider narratives. That is, pre-understanding creates a need to present
more complete or accurate versions of outsider lives; but at the same time,
it complicates their presentation because stories that do not conform to
our pre-understandings are more difficult for readers/listeners to accept.'
In this essay, I explore how the existence of pre-understanding affects
the questions of authority and credibility in the context of outsider narra-
tives. In Part I, I elaborate the concept of pre-understanding and explain
how personal narratives can be used to combat it. I then examine the
claims to authority that outsider storytellers reasonably can make when
they use their stories to combat pre-understanding. In particular, I address
concerns about whether a particular storyteller represents an "authentic"
outsider voice. I argue that these concerns are misplaced, especially when
a story demonstrates how an individual was treated because others under-
stood her to be a member of a particular group.
In Part II, I argue that when outsiders recount stories that conflict with
common pre-understanding, credibility questions inevitably arise. I suggest
some tactics for presenting outsider stories that may minimize these ques-
tions. I reject Farber and Sherry's suggestion that we completely eschew
first person narratives to avoid credibility issues. I also take issue with
Tushnet's analysis of the credibility of Patricia Williams's work and his
focus on narrative style as the key to the credibility issue.
In the conclusion, I briefly explain my understanding of why outsider
scholars feel compelled to keep telling the stories of our experiences as
outsiders, despite the discomfort these stories obviously bring to others.
Throughout this essay, in keeping with its themes, I often rely on examples
from my own experiences as a gay man. However, I believe my analysis
also applies to storytelling by members of other systematically disadvan-
taged groups.
I. PRE-UNDERSTANDING AND THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY
Running through much of Farber and Sherry's critique of narrative
scholarship is a concern for what I call the question of authority. How do
we know whether the story you tell is significant?5 Although Mark Tushnet
does not ask this question directly, his piece discusses generally the role of
law in mediating the particular and the general.6 Specifically, he is con-
cerned that legal actors are focusing too much on particularity and not
thinking enough about how individual stories relate to more general prin-
4. See Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of Storytelling in Law, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 79, 105
(1991) (stating that "the law is, at least some of the time, highly resistant to stories which
challenge its own conventions and ideological narratives.").
5. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 824-27, 831-40 (discussing standards for evaluat-
ing stories as scholarship).
6. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 252-58 (describing the role of adjudication as mediating
the particular and the general).
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ciples.7 Thus, indirectly, he too raises the question of authority, for when
we believe that specific stories have authority, we are willing to draw
general principles from them. In this Part, I will try to provide some
answers to the authority question. But first I must introduce the concept of
pre-understanding.
A. PRE-UNDERSTANDING AND OUTSIDER EXPERIENCE
Our culture contains a wide variety of assumptions, both good and bad,
about categories of people.8 Although not everybody believes in the stron-
gest versions of these assumptions-that every member of the group
strongly displays the characteristic-most people understand that our soci-
ety connects certain traits with certain categories. For example, society
connects Jews with being cheap and clever, African-American men with
being athletic and violent, and gay men with being artistic and effeminate.
I refer to these- assumptions as pre-understanding. Pre-understanding
about a particular group can interfere with discourse about that group
because many people believe they "know" important things about mem-
bers of the group, things which often are not true about many group
members. The pre-understanding of judges and lawyers can infect the legal
process and build incorrect or overbroad assumptions into the structure of
laws and legal decisions. For example, in an earlier article,9 I argued that
the pre-understanding that lesbians and gay men live lives in which sexual
activity is separate from love and family is an important part of the
majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,1° which allowed states to criminal-
ize same-sex sexual activity.
Stories about individuals are a particularly useful way to combat pre-
understanding for at least two reasons. First, because a particular form of
pre-understanding may be very deeply ingrained in the culture, people
may have trouble seeing its existence or significance unless confronted
with specific examples of how it operates. For example, stories demonstrat-
ing the number of ways lesbians and gay men are discouraged from
discussing their lives publicly can be used to show how many people
believe that any discussion of homosexuality is improper "flaunting.'' 11
Second, because pre-understanding often consists of gross overgeneraliza-
7. Id. at 260.
8. See, e.g., Fajer, supra note 3, at 525 (citing commonly held assumptions about differ-
ences between groups of people); Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 839 (citing studies
showing that humans tend to engage in "what we commonly call stereotyping").
9. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 513-14, 544 (discussing the assumptions underlying Bowers).
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 571-91 (describing several types of discrimination that
demonstrate the pre-understanding that gay men and lesbians are tolerable only to the
extent they keep their sexual orientation secret). I personally have had some success
conveying to non-gay people the way in which everyday, inadvertent revelations of sexual
orientation are treated as improper "flaunting."
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tions, it may be effectively combatted or mediated through the use of
counterexamples. Credible stories about "masculine" gay men, for ex-
ample, can at least help defeat the strong versions of pre-understanding
that presume all members of the group share a particular characteris-
tic-in this case, effeminacy.1 2 Similarly, some Jews offered stories of Jews
aiding African-Americans to counter claims of Jewish racism made by the
Nation of Islam. 3
Pre-understanding creates special tensions in the lives of members of
traditionally excluded groups. Society constantly sends out messages that
we must have certain characteristics because we are gay or African-
American or female. We may believe these messages, in whole or in part.
14
Yet these messages often contradict our own lived experience of ourselves
and of other members of our groups. This creates a dissonance in our lives:
we are immersed in a culture that tells us what we must be like because we
fit into certain categories, yet we live individual lives that stray, often
wildly, from the expressed norms for the category.15 This dissonance can
be a source of insight allowing us to see more easily certain aspects of our
society, particularly common pre-understandings about groups to which we
belong.16 Thus, we tell stories gleaned from our particular perspectives
12. In addition, stories about the interaction between stereotypes and people's lives can
make people see the effects pre-understanding can have. For example, stories about gay
male "camping"-deliberate, overdone, stereotypically feminine behavior-suggest that it
was developed as community-building, self-affirming behavior in the context of the pervasive
pre-understanding that stereotypically feminine behavior is associated with male homosexual-
ity. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 614-15 (explaining the role of camping among gay men);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 627 (1994) (relating
accounts of camping in both gay and non-gay environments). These stories may help non-gay
people understand the effects of constant exposure to pre-understanding that associates
stereotypically feminine behavior with male homosexuality.
13. See Jean Soman, Jewish Soldiers Gave Their Lives in the War to End Slavery, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 14, 1994, at 11A (noting that 7,000 Jews fought for the Union and describing
the efforts of one Jewish Union officer, Colonel Marcus M. Spiegel, who fought and died at
Vicksburg).
14. Certainly some gay men and lesbians have internalized the notion that we are
incapable of forming lasting relationships, and gay men often assume very quickly that an
effeminate man is "one of us."
15. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as
Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2274 (1992) (presenting an example of the duality of an
outsider).
16. The most famous elaboration of this dual perspective is found in W.E.B. Du Bois,
THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK. Du Bois explains:
[Tihe Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with a second sight
in this American world,-a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar
sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks
on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,-an American, a
Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in
one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
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with the hope that they will demonstrate the existence of pre-understand-
ing to those who are situated in more privileged positions and help them to
understand how pre-understanding affects our lives.' 7
In an earlier work, I laid out some of the ideas about pre-understanding
I apply here. 18 Interestingly, although Farber and Sherry were aware of my
work, they did not choose to address any of its substantive arguments
about the proper use of narrative. Instead, in a footnote, they cited the
article for the following proposition: "Because of the phenomenon of
'closeting,' information about the lives of gay men and lesbians may be
unavailable to scholars. In this case, storytelling may be particularly useful
as a way of filling in informational gaps."' 9 This treatment of gay narrative
scholarship is troubling because it indicates that Farber and Sherry have
not recognized the common ground among outsider groups. Members of
more privileged groups always have pre-understanding about outsiders
but often are not exposed to the outsider's own stories. As a white male, I
don't feel I have ready access to the experiences of women or people of
color. Most of what I think I know about these experiences comes from
narratives. Patricia Williams's narratives about race,2" Robin West's ac-
counts of violence and coercion in women's lives,21 Martha Mahoney's
stories by and about battered women22-all have greatly affected my
understanding of these important issues. Students in my Identity Politics
Seminar repeatedly told me how much they believe they learned from
reading outsider accounts 3 and from listening to their classmates relate
stories about their own lives. Because pre-understanding often constitutes
most of what people know about outsiders, "informational gaps" abound,
and storytelling for all outsider groups "may be particularly useful."2 4
W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 16-17 (reprinted ed. 1961). Other references to
multiple consciousness are common among minority scholars. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note
15, at 2239, 2274-75 (stating that the "burden/gift of dual subjectivity enables those who
bear it to recognize and articulate social realities that are unseen by those who live more
fully within the world of privilege"); Adrien Katherine Wing, Brief Reflections Toward a
Multiplicative Theory and Praxis of Being, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 182 (1991).
17. See Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46
VAND. L. REV. 665, 666, 670-71 (1993) (describing the function and importance of the
counterstory to outsider groups); Tushnet, supra note 2, at 260-61.
18. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 522-30.
19. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 829 n.119.
20. E.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
21. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
22. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
23. Jerome Culp reports a similar experience with his students. See Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., You Can Take Them to Water But You Can't Make Them Drink: Black Legal
Scholarship and White Legal Scholars, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1021, 1035.
24. Delgado, supra note 17, at 670-71.
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B. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORITY
A common set of concerns about the use of personal narratives involves
questions of authority-how much weight a reader/listener should give the
stories. These questions can take a narrow form: Is this story or this
narrator typical of the group?25 They can also be raised more broadly: Is
the group so diverse that there really is little point in assuming that any
story from a member of the group carries any weight as being representa-
tive of the group? Stated bluntly, the listener wants to know why she
should pay much attention to the storyteller's individual experience.
One strong claim to authority for outsider narratives stems from the
existence of pre-understanding. As outsiders, our social situation gives us a
perspective that allows us to identify more easily the pre-understandings
others apply to us, precisely because it so often jars with our own under-
standing of who we are. In addition, our constant exposure to the disso-
nance I described earlier makes it easier for us to see patterns where
others might see isolated incidents.26 Moreover, our interactions with
other members of the outsider group may tell us how common a particular
type of incident is.2 7
For example, last year, I was a partial season ticket holder for the
fledgling Florida Marlins. A heavy-drinking man in his thirties held season
tickets for seats about three rows in front of mine. Often after several
beers, he began calling people who annoyed him for one reason or another
"faggot" and "homo." A non-gay person might find this troubling; certainly
every gay man within hearing will. Non-gay listeners are less likely to be
aware how often men in our society use these terms as the ultimate insult.
Nor are they likely to think about this as yet another moment when, as a
gay activist, I have to choose whether or not to come out: "Excuse me, sir,
but as a gay man and a season ticket holder, I find your use of those terms
as insults offensive."
Similarly, non-gay people observing the brouhaha about lifting the ban
on openly gay men and lesbians in the military might not give much
thought to why Congress paid so much attention to the four minutes or so
a day that enlisted personnel spend in the showers.28 Gay people are more
25. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 979-80, 1009,
1028-29 (1991).
26. This should answer Farber and Sherry's claim that "there has been no demonstration
of how [the perspectives of minority groups] differ from the various perspectives underlying
traditional scholarship." Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 814 (footnote omitted).
27. Thus, I disagree with Farber and Sherry's claim that narrative scholars are "less
concerned than conventional scholars about whether stories are ... typical." Id. at 808.
Rather, I think we often rely heavily on our experiences as participants in discourse within
minority communities to satisfy the requirement of typicality. It may be that we could do a
better job both making this reliance explicit and presenting evidence to support our beliefs
that our stories are typical.
28. Indeed, given the prevalence of the pre-understanding involved, non-gay people may
find Congress's focus natural. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 537-47.
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likely to see that this focus is part of the common pre-understanding that
being gay means to engage in constant predatory sex. Senator Sam Nunn's
apparent obsession with showers is just an example of the way millions of
complicated gay lives are reduced to "the gay lifestyle," which means,
primarily, sexual activity. I am able to make these connections more easily
than most non-gay people because the underlying assumptions contradict
my sense of who I am. I find the shower stories particularly jarring because
I spend most of my time in the locker room at my gym staring at the floor
precisely to avoid giving others the sort of discomfort on which the Senate
hearings seem to focus.
Note that the claim to authority by outside narrative scholars is not that
nobody else is capable of seeing the things which we relate.29 Clearly we
believe that they can see them, or there would be little point in retelling
our stories to a general audience. Indeed, my hope in telling stories and in
identifying common forms of pre-understanding regarding sexual identity
is precisely that non-gay people will recognize patterns in events within
their own experience once they are pointed out.3 °
Moreover, the claim of authority is not based on the false syllogism,
"The subject of this story is a gay man. This happened to him. This
happens to gay men." Rather, the claim is, "This happened to the subject
of this story, apparently for no other reason than that he was identified as
a gay man. If this happened to him merely because of this identification, it
is likely to happen to others if they too are identified as gay men. And,
from his perspective as a gay man, he is more easily able to see that the
story is part of larger patterns." This view of authority for outsider story-
telling seems to successfully counter two of the more common versions of
the authority critique: concerns about "authenticity" and doubts about the
existence of a unitary "voice" for an outsider group.
29. This seems to be the position that Farber and Sherry call the strong version of the
different voice thesis. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 814.
30. Farber and Sherry claim that the storytelling literature contains few attempts to
connect the events with the experiences of nonoutsider readers. Id. at 826-27. They seem to
be looking for specific parallels: "My experience here is like your's there." Yet part of the
way outsider stories can resonate with more privileged people is by saying, "Look at this
event, which your own experience should tell you is common in our society. Now think about
how it feels to me." Much of the elaboration in my earlier piece on pre-understanding of gay
issues was of this type: pointing out patterns that other people might miss because of their
privileges. Fajer, supra note 3, at 537-47, 571-91, 607-11. Moreover, by pointing out common
forms of pre-understanding, many of the stories are specifically about the beliefs of nonoutsid-
ers. See Delgado, supra note 17, at 671 ("The counterstory focuses not on helping a white
understand a black, but on helping a white understand a white."). The reader's "flash of
recognition" that Kathryn Abrams describes (and which Farber and Sherry question), is thus
the result of discovering new perspectives about the reader's own experiences and beliefs,
rather than the result of appeals to "the reader's preconceptions and biases." Abrams, supra
note 25, at 1024; Farber and Sherry, supra note 1, at 836-37.
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1. Authenticity
I have heard variations of the authenticity critique from students and
other professors. It is often leveled at scholars of color and goes something
like this:
You are a relatively well-off, well-educated, upper middle class scholar,
leading a very different life from most people of color in this country.
You hold very progressive views on a variety of social issues, views that
polling data indicate are very different from many/most members of your
group. Why should we listen to your accounts of your "struggles" as a
person of color? You are so atypical that we do not consider you an
authentic person of color.
3 1
A response to this critique is that nothing in the claim to authority I
have described relies on all members of the particular group having
identical or even similar life experiences, methods of thinking, or political
beliefs. The authority arises from the treatment members of the group
receive on account of their membership in the group. Thus, if the police
harass an African-American man because he is running in a sweatsuit in a
"fancy" neighborhood, the man's account of his experience is an authentic
description of racism, whether he is a law professor, a gardener, or
unemployed. His account should not be criticized as inauthentic because
he employs the articulate presentation we would expect of a well-educated
scholar.3 2 Moreover, because society repeatedly sends me messages that I
have certain characteristics because I belong to a group, it should not be
surprised that I organize my responses to those messages around being a
member of that group, whether or not I am in some sense "typical" of the
group.
In addition, the relative privilege of the storyteller may actually strengthen
the message of some stories. I have heard people criticize Patricia Willi-
ams's famous Benetton narrative33 as a "bad" story because Williams is a
relatively privileged person who was trying to enter a relatively chic estab-
lishment, and if she was unable to fully participate in consumer commercial-
31. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 817-18, 828; see WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 51
(asking what makes her experience the "real black one").
32. As Christine Littleton has suggested to me, the authenticity critique also is troubling
because it seems to claim the right for those who are not members of the outsider group to
decide what an authentic outsider is. To the extent authenticity analysis makes any sense,
surely it must be the right of members of the group to decide for themselves what makes
them authentic. See CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 23-32 (1993) (criticizing overconcern
with authenticity among African-Americans).
33. Williams was shopping in New York and saw a sweater in a Benetton's window that
she wished to purchase for her mother. She recalls that "I pressed my round brown face to
the window and my finger to the buzzer, seeking admittance." The keeper of the door, a
white teenager blowing bubble gum, denied her entrance, saying the store was closed. White
people were clearly visible shopping inside. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 44-45.
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ism, so what? Getting into the store was not that important; many people,
African-Americans in particular, have worse problems. My response to the
relationship between her privilege and the story was just the opposite.
Because of the large number of African-Americans living in poverty, class
and race issues are often conflated, sometimes usefully, other times less so.
If Professor Williams told the Benetton story about "an African-American
woman," some members of the audience easily might conclude that she
was rejected for visible indicia of class-something that suggested to the
doorboy that she did not really have the money to shop at the store. That
the experience happened to a woman with Professor Williams's other
privileges helps to distill the class issue out of the story.3 4 What happened
to her was purely the result of her race. The existence of such a pure
example of racism in a middle class setting was part of what made the story
striking to me when I first heard it because it tends to defeat the common
pre-understanding that overt acts of racism are things of the past.
2. Anti-Essentialism and the Unfortunate Metaphor of Voice
Another common critique of outsider narratives is broader. It responds
to the rhetoric of "excluded voices" that many outsider scholars have
employed. 36 The critique basically worries that because outsider groups
are very diverse, no one person can claim to speak for the group. People of
color, for example, include African-Americans, Native Americans, Asian-
Americans, and Latinos who belong to different classes, genders, religions,
political persuasions, and sexual identities. Thus, no one person can make
any believable claim to speak in the "voice of color." In one version of this
critique, scholars have criticized some outsider jurisprudence for "essential-
ism;" that is, for assuming that all members of an outgroup share certain
essential characteristics without considering the many large subgroups
within the larger classes of women, gay people, African-Americans, and
other groups.37 Sherry and Farber elaborate a slightly different version of
this claim. They conclude, after fairly extensive analysis, that the evidence
of the existence of a "female voice" and a "voice of color" is weak.38
Although essentialism is a danger in narrative scholarship, storytellers
34. This point is likely to be even clearer to audiences who see her recount the story in
person. On the occasions I have heard her speak, she always has been as polished in her
appearance as she is in her writing.
35. For example, the white students in my property law class generally have been skeptical
about the continued existence of housing discrimination until confronted with recent statis-
tics and news stories.
36. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987).
37. See generally ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race & Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
38. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 809-19.
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can frame stories in a manner that makes them less susceptible to this
failing.39 To do so, we can focus on pre-understanding in the way I have
already described. We can tell stories about ourselves, not so much to
show how we are representative of our group, but how the society makes
essentializing assumptions about us because of the groups to which we
belong. These stories do not purport to show that all members of the
group behave a certain way. Instead, they demonstrate that people com-
monly believe members of a group behave in specific ways and they show
that some portion of the group does not conform to the stereotype or at
least that the relationship between the stereotype and reality is complex.4 °
This way of thinking about storytelling also should eliminate the unneces-
sary focus on the unfortunate metaphor of voice. At some point in the past
decade, perhaps originating with Carol Gilligan's work,4" the notion of
"voices" came to represent the idea of including viewpoints of outgroup
members in legal discourse.42 While certainly outsider voices need to be
part of any dialogue about legal issues, the metaphor has created its own
problems.43
First, the metaphor of voice focuses too much attention on the person
and not enough on her experiences. Because voices are very personal, we
generally do not view them as products of particular life experiences. Thus,
there is a danger that in looking for gay and lesbian voices, for example, we
will listen to any person who fits the category "gay" or "lesbian." Instead,
we should listen for people who talk about how their experiences and
self-awareness arising out of their sexual identity or their treatment by
others who believe they are gay or lesbian has enabled them to see things
about the substance and functioning of our society that are difficult for
non-gay people to see. 44
39. Another issue that merits discussion is how best to avoid essentialist or solipsistic
assumptions when story-telling. Tushnet's critique of Williams suggests that stories can lose
effectiveness if they demonstrate that the storyteller lacks awareness of her own privileges.
See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 270-71. As a storyteller, I need to think carefully about how my
experience of what I perceive to be homophobic incidents is colored by my being white and
male and whether my experience can be generalized to lesbians or gay people of color. All of
us who use narrative need to be open to further discussion about these problems. For
discussion of this issue, see Abrams, supra note 25, at 1029-30.
40. See, e.g., supra note 12 (discussing "camping" behavior in the gay community).
41. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
42. See, e.g., Steven F. Freidell, The "Different Voice" in Jewish Law: Some Parallels to a
Feminist Jurisprudence, 67 IND. L.J. 915 (1992); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 36; Susan
Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 763 (1993).
43. See Delgado, supra note 17, at 669 (noting that "voice is a false issue").
44. This sort of reasoning may underlie Alex Johnson's claim, reported by Farber &
Sherry, that "[tjhose who intend to speak in the voice of color do so." Farber & Sherry,
supra note 1, at 814 (paraphrasing). Those who deliberately employ the perspective gained
from being a member of a particular group can be said to be speaking in the voice of that
group.
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I realize this sounds close to a kind of result-oriented notion of voice
that has been criticized: that some academics will only accept as genuine
"voices" those whose political views are consonant with their own.4 5 I am,
I believe, making a more subtle claim. In order for a storyteller to make
claims on our attention based on her membership in a particular group, her
story must demonstrate that it was her membership in the group that led
to the events in the story or better enabled her to understand the signifi-
cance of what she describes. These claims are likely to be strong when the
storyteller is describing an experience that demonstrates or counters some
pre-understanding about her group.
Second, the plural "voices" metaphor has an unfortunate tendency to
drift into the singular. People concerned about voices of color, for example,
may start to look for one true "voice of color," and examine stories to find
it. Farber and Sherry's discussion of the existence of distinctive voices
seems to assume that outsiders are claiming a right to be heard based on a
distinctive or different unitary voice.4 6 The existence of a "true voice"
simply is not necessary to justify the use of personal stories by members of
outsider groups.4 7 If our claim to authority rests on how we are described
or treated by others because of our group identities, we need not claim to
have unitary voices or even unitary experiences to give our stories general
relevance. The stories will inevitably reveal aspects of the pre-understand-
ing about our identity groups that our identities help us to see.
In sum, as a gay, white, male, Jewish law professor, I hardly can claim to
be a typical Jewish voice or gay voice or white voice. Yet, based on these
categories, people make assumptions about what I am like. When others
try to tell me who I am based on one or more aspects of my identity, surely
I deserve to be heard when I point out the cultural stereotypes others
apply to me and describe what it feels like to experience the dissonance
between who I am and who I am "supposed" to be. My claim to authority
is not that I am an archetypical outsider voice, but that my perspective as
an outsider makes it easier to see how pre-understanding about my iden-
tity operates.
45. See id. at 816-17; Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law:
New Words, Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2113 (1989).
46. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 809-19.
47. Although I am agnostic on the question of a "voice of color," I am quite convinced
that nothing like a unified gay voice exists. Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are brought up
throughout society in a variety of different subcultures, classes, religions, etc. A unified gay
voice would be a most unlikely phenomenon. I do think attempts to locate or develop unified
voices tend to interfere with recognition of those who exist at the intersection of outsider
groups. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Poli-
tics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Wing, supra note 16, at 191. The mutual lack of recognition
between the gay/lesbian/bisexual community and communities of color seems to me a good
example of the problems that can occur if groups are insufficiently aware of diversity within
their midst.
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II. THE QUESTION OF CREDIBILITY AND THE USE OF FIRST-PERSON
NARRATIVES
A second important issue raised by Tushnet and by Farber and Sherry is
the credibility of outsider narratives. The recurrence of this issue in
discussions of outsider narratives is unsurprising. These narratives often
challenge widely held pre-understandings about minority groups. Faced
with a conflict between deep-seated beliefs and a contradicting story, some
people may adjust their beliefs, but others are likely to reject the story as
untrue.48 The credibility problem is particularly acute in the case of
first-person narratives, which do not obtain the presumption of objectivity
and truth that attach to material written in other forms.49
Given that credibility issues are so likely to arise, what should narrative
scholars do? Farber and Sherry advocate eschewing first-person narration
altogether.5 ° Tushnet argues that eliminating stylistic flaws and improving
"narrative integrity" may limit credibility problems. 1 I will discuss these
critiques in turn and then suggest ways to present first-person narratives
that limit the credibility problems these critics raise.
A. SCHOLARLY CONVERSATION AND FIRST-PERSON NARRATIVES
Farber and Sherry argue that first-person narratives are undesirable as a
form of scholarship because they may cut off further academic discourse:
[SIcholars should not be readily allowed to offer their own experiences as
evidence. The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challeng-
ing the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult,
for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's
emotional stability or veracity.
52
This analysis implicitly rests on the determination that the harm done to
scholarly discourse by self-censoring outweighs any special benefits first-
person narratives may provide. Farber and Sherry both overstate the
inhibiting effect these stories have on scholarly conversation and fail to
consider the specific advantages of first-person narration.
48. See WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 110-14 (noting that a white student rejected the idea
that Beethoven might have been black); Abrams, supra note 25, at 1024; Jane B. Baron,
Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 263 (1994) ("Background assumptions deter-
mine, in great measure, whether a particular account will be heard as a ... persuasive or
believable story."); Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J.
313, 323 (1992) (suggesting that credibility problems arise because people understand the
implications of outsider narratives and would rather challenge the truth of the narratives
than confront the implications of the stories).
49. See WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 44-50.
50. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 835-36.
51. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 311.
52. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 835-36; see also Abrams, supra note 25, at 980
(noting similar arguments).
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1. Inhibition of Discourse
The claim that stories inhibit further discourse seems a bit strange.
Considerable scholarly discussion already exists regarding the works of
scholars who, like Patricia Williams, employ narratives extensively.53 More
importantly, scholars who are skeptical about the truth of narratives that
demonstrate and counter pre-understanding have available a variety of
responses that are consistent with both civility and scholarly dialogue.
Some of these include:
"That story is quite foreign to my experience. Can you demonstrate to
me that the problems it describes are widespread enough to merit legal or
systemic changes as opposed to simply my personal sympathy?"
"I take it that the problem you believe that this story raises is X. Yet my
interpretation of the same story would be different."
"I have trouble seeing what solutions are possible to the problems raised
by your story."
"I take it that the solution you are proposing is X. I think that solution
causes more problems than it solves."
These responses leave a great deal of room for further scholarly conver-
sation.54 Undoubtedly, some scholars will continue to perceive the use of
first-person narratives as "silencing" to some extent because of norms of
civility. Farber and Sherry feel that this limited form of silencing justifies
what seems to me to be a much broader silencing-discarding all first-
person narratives. Yet nowhere in their analysis do they discuss the costs
of preventing the use of the first-person.
2. The Strengths of First-Person Narrative
Narrative can create empathy that helps listeners to understand con-
cepts that might be difficult for them to grasp when conveyed as abstrac-
tions.55 First-person narratives often are especially powerful in helping
people develop empathy for members of excluded groups. The listener or
reader must confront the fact that the emotional punch line of the story
involves a specific person with whom the listener or reader is interacting, a
person with whom the listener or reader may already have identified in
some way because of the context in which the story is told. The key events
53. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 25, at 995-1004; Culp, supra note 23, at 1030-41 & 1026
n.21 (citing sources).
54. Of course, none of these responses is possible if the reader has no idea what the point
of a story is supposed to be. Farber and Sherry suggest that the absence of traditional
analysis in the presentation of some stories makes discourse difficult because readers simply
do not understand the significance of the stories. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 847-48.
Obviously, some stories are easier to understand than others, but difficulty understanding
some stories does not necessitate eliminating the whole narrative genre. Indeed, much legal
scholarship is not easily accessible at first reading.
55. See, e.g., Fajer, supra note 3, at 521-22; Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); West, supra note 21, at 85-86, 90, 144.
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of the story may be hard to discount as occurring only to some easily
dismissible "Other" when the listener or reader is already engaged with
the storyteller.
The lived experience of many gay men and lesbians confirms the power
of first-person narration. Many of us know that relating our own coming-
out stories to people has forced them to focus on the reality of anti-gay
discrimination. Exposure to third-person stories in the media simply does
not have the same effect. One friend confided to me recently that she had
never thought seriously about gay issues until she knew I was gay and had
a particular face to hold up against the stereotypes and comments about
gay people. Farber and Sherry's claim that "conversion stories are rela-
tively scarce''56 demonstrates a lack of familiarity with anecdotal and
statistical evidence about gay men and lesbians, much of which strongly
suggests that interactions with real individuals have changed many peo-
ple's attitudes toward gay issues.57
Another strength of the first person is that its very use can counter
pre-understanding. For example, I find Patricia Williams's stories about
her encounters with racism particularly powerful because they counter the
pre-understanding that middle class members of racial and ethnic minori-
ties are pampered and privileged people who are aided unfairly by affirma-
tive action. A third-person account of racist interactions involving African-
American law professors might have some of the same effect. Without a
particular "I" to create boundaries on the possible scope of the story,
however, a listener may well assume that there is more to the story than
they are being told and thus dismiss it due to some other pre-understand-
ing. For example, readers of Patricia Williams's first-person stories will be
aware at least that she is an articulate law professor. The confining "I"
may make some of them less likely to attribute her exclusion from Benet-
ton to the presumed existence of some of the nastier forms of common
pre-understanding about African-Americans: "She must have been one of
those women who was dirty,"58 or "had an attitude," or was "less civilized"
in some other way.
The first person creates a second type of challenge to pre-understand-
ing. As I have noted, pre-understanding often consists of very broad
overgeneralizations about characteristics presumed to be associated with
particular categories of people. A first-person storyteller will embody a
number of characteristics and categories, some of which are not supposed
to go together. When she presents stories that demonstrate her complex-
ity, she can challenge overgeneralizations her audience might otherwise
56. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 826.
57. See Eskridge, supra note 12, at 614-15; Fajer, supra note 3, at 599.
58. One of my African-American students tells me this is a pre-understanding many
people associate with wearing dreadlocks.
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apply to her. For example, I belong to categories such as lawyer, baseball
fan, chef, Jew, homeowner, theater director, spendthrift, gay man, and
sloppy dresser. For many people, sloppy dresser and baseball fan do not go
with gay man, spendthrift does not go with Jew, and, surprisingly often,
lawyer does not go with theater director. When I tell stories about myself
that show that I incorporate several of these categories, I can help shake
the audience's belief in the pre-understandings that suggest my component
parts are incompatible.
Finally, using first-person stories makes future conversation about the
details of a story easier in at least one important respect. If readers or
listeners need details of the story to clarify its meaning, they can raise
questions in person or in print, and the author can respond.59 Third-
person narratives, garnered from the research and writing of others, are
closed in this respect; people who disagree about the story's significance
will have difficulty obtaining clarifying details.6"
In sum, first-person stories have significant advantages over third-party
stories for countering common pre-understandings. As we have seen, using
these stories might limit subsequent discourse to some extent, but many
opportunities for scholarly interchange remain available. Thus, Farber and
Sherry do not make a persuasive case that the harm to discourse necessi-
tates abandoning a tool outsider scholars have found to be powerful and
effective.
B. TUSHNET'S CRITIQUE OF PATRICIA WILLIAMS'S CREDIBILITY
Perhaps because of the norms of civility they invoke, Farber and Sherry
restrict their discussion of credibility to general comments about narrative
scholarship in the abstract. By contrast, Mark Tushnet engages in a quite
particular discussion of credibility issues raised by Patricia Williams's
narratives. Tushnet argues the proper way to evaluate narrative scholar-
ship is to assess a story's "narrative integrity., 61 He uses this methodology
to critique the work of Patricia Williams, concluding that her stylistic
59. See Baron, supra note 48, at 281. This is what Mark Tushnet was doing when he raised
Patricia Williams's Au Coton story. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74. Tushnet
challenges Williams's omission of the race of the salespeople, explaining why he thinks it
would have been an essential element of her story.
60. Another, perhaps less important, strength of first-person narration is that it allows
minority scholars to honestly lay out our thought processes. Often, a particular event will
heighten the dissonance between our lived experience and some pre-understanding in a way
that triggers or clarifies our thought processes. This leads to a kind of reverse Cartesian
logic: I exist (in a society in which I do not quite fit), therefore I think (about the nature of
that society). Having achieved what I believe to be some understanding of our mutual social
condition, must I search for other people's stories to illustrate my point? Or can I simply use
the story that helped me understand the point if it is more easily accessible to me and may
make the point better than other stories I can find? To my mind, intellectual honesty
suggests the latter.
61. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 252, 311.
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"failures" may cause her readers to call into question the credibility of her
stories and, therefore, detract from their power as narratives.6 z I find his
attacks on Williams's credibility very unpersuasive.63
Williams's stories contain extensive detail, self-conscious self-examina-
tion, and much ambiguity and uncertainty, all of which commonly are seen
as providing verisimilitude to stories. Many of Tushnet's points go not to
the credibility of the stories but to their effectiveness in persuading
listeners of their larger implications. For example, Tushnet is very troubled
by what he calls Williams's "voice of righteousness": a tone of unself-con-
scious moral superiority he finds in her work.' Tushnet points to evidence
of classism and self-righteousness in her work that, for him, demonstrates
that she has not carefully applied her own insights to her own behavior.65
He transforms this observation into a point about credibility:
The unsteady notes in her story show that Williams has not recon-
structed her self-image to take account of the troubling behavior she
reports. Readers may then transform Williams's righteousness into self-
righteousness and become suspicious of the accuracy with which she
recounts other stories.
66
I find Tushnet's premises suspect. Because Williams spends a significant
amount of time in print struggling with her own thought processes, the
claim that she is unself-conscious is unconvincing. Even if one takes the
point about Williams's unself-consciousness as true, the link to questions
62. Id. at 266-71.
63. Tushnet's strongest attack on Williams's credibility concerns Williams's account of a
jury argument that she made about adulterated sausage. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 272. In
the argument, Williams asks whether any junk that is put through a sausage-making machine
thereby becomes "sausage." See WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 107-09. The story contains
details that seem hyperbolic, including an objection from opposing counsel on the grounds of
"too much critical theory in the courtroom." Id. The story also lacks the verifying details that
Williams typically employs in her other accounts.
When I read Williams' story, I never took it to be an attempt to accurately portray the
courtroom scene. Instead, the point of this story is the rhetorical move that Williams sets up
in her argument-she later uses the sausage machine as a metaphor for law and other things.
The import of the story does not depend upon its accuracy; its point is not to demonstrate
anything about Williams's (or black people's, or women's) lived experiences in the court-
room. Because the story is not offered in any sense as "evidence" of real world experience, I o
do not believe any hyperbole it contains raises serious questions about the credibility of the
other stories she offers as evidence of lived experience. See also Abrams, supra note 25, at
1026 (questioning truth of this story but arguing that it is nonetheless effective).
Tushnet makes a similar, if more brief, attack on the credibility of Catharine MacKinnon
based solely on one passage in MacKinnon's work. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 261-62. Gary
Peller has demonstrated convincingly the weakness of Tushnet's argument about the pas-
sage. See Peller, supra note 48, at 319-20.
64. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 266.
65. Id. at 266-71.
66. Id. at 270.
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about her credibility is missing. That an author is not a paragon of virtue,
has not thoroughly applied her own moral reasoning to herself, is occasion-
ally inconsistent-all add to the verisimilitude of stories. These warts
suggest the recollections of a real and imperfect person dealing in a real
and imperfect way with difficult issues. I would be much more suspicious of
an author whose account of her own activities suggested that she had
always behaved in a manner perfectly consistent with her stated ideals.67
Tushnet cites Williams's Au Coton story as a particularly significant
example of her failure of authorial integrity.68 In that story, Williams finds
herself a troubled, silent conspirator when salespeople in a store in which
she is shopping make anti-Semitic comments about customers they per-
ceive as Jewish. 69 Tushnet's complaint about her account is that she does
not identify the race of the salespeople, leading the reader to take from
the story supposedly uncertain messages.7 ° Because the passage about
credibility quoted above directly follows his critique of the Au Coton story,
Tushnet strongly suggests that Williams's failure to identify the race of the
anti-Semites calls Williams's credibility into question.
Again, it is not clear to me that this omission, if it even is one, is a
credibility issue at all. The story is full of reality-enhancing detail. Williams's
own discomfort with the situation is apparent in her account. Even if, as
Tushnet implies, she deliberately avoids difficult issues by failing to mention
race, I am not sure why this suggests that the story is otherwise inaccurate.
More importantly, I read Williams's decision not to mention the race of
the anti-Semites not as an elision of an uncomfortable issue, but rather as
a conscious choice to further a point. The anti-Semitic events Williams
describes create a polarization in the store based not on race, but on
religion. Undoubtedly, the workers in the shop assumed (not unreason-
ably) from Williams's race that she was unlikely to be Jewish and thus were
willing to include her in the privileged position they developed. For an
African-American woman used to dealing with situations in which race is
made the primary polarity, the sudden involvement in a situation in which
race is not the most salient issue was, by her own account, quite striking.
Thus, the failure to mention race calls attention to the way relative
privilege can rapidly alter in different circumstances and focuses the
67. Another reading of Tushnet's point might be that once a reader finds a storyteller
guilty of the moral failing of self-righteousness, the reader is more likely to believe that the
storyteller is capable of lying. I doubt that readers think this way, but I am willing to be
convinced with better evidence.
68. See id. at 268-70.
69. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 126-29.
70. Tushnet argues that if the salespeople were African-American, the story would be
about the difficulty of criticizing anti-Semitism within the black community. Tushnet, supra
note 2, at 268. By contrast, if the salespeople were white, the story would be about "how a
vicious community can sustain itself by at least fleetingly securing the affiliation of those who
it demeans on other occasions." Id. at 269.
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reader on Williams's attempts to grapple with her unintended roles (pre-
sumed Christian and silent oppressor). I find the story powerful because
the very removal of the race issue-putting Williams into silent complicity
with the oppressors-creates the possibility of connection with whites who
may have been involved in similar scenes as silent participants.7' In any
event, this explanation of the story suggests that Williams's decision does
not throw her credibility into question.
Tushnet concludes his critique of Williams's work with the striking
observation that her work would be more credible and presumably would
have more "narrative integrity" if she had labeled her stories as fiction.
72
Read generously, his suggestion may simply mean that her literary style
may prevent readers from thinking of her stories as real. Under this view,
by calling her work fictional, Williams would engage her readers with the
emotional power of her stories without the risk of alienating them by
forcing them to deal with the credibility question. In short, Tushnet's
critique of Williams may simply be that she has couched her stories in ways
that make them less effective as rhetorical tools than they could be.7 3
Tushnet never explains, however, why labelling the work as fiction would
make readers more likely to confront the social and political problems that
Williams's stories raise. As I noted earlier, gay people often find that
presenting our own true stories is often effective in changing attitudes.
There is little reason to believe that the effectiveness or credibility of
minority scholars would be aided by a refusal to label our lived experience
as truth. In addition, Tushnet does not explain why labelling narrative
work as fiction would cure supposed stylistic mishaps. Indeed, in focusing
on what he perceives to be stylistic weaknesses, Tushnet does not present
any real analysis of what sort of style he believes would enhance credibility.
C. CREDIBILITY AND THE STORYTELLER
Farber and Sherry never acknowledge that credibility issues are a natu-
ral and expected response to outsider narratives. Credibility issues arise
because of the tension between the outsider storyteller's sense of identity
and the common pre-understanding of these groups. Tushnet acknowl-
edges this74 but focuses his credibility analysis more on literary style than
71. Interestingly, the students in my Identity Politics Seminar came to differing conclu-
sions on this issue. Like Gary Peller, most assumed that the salespeople were white, but a
significant minority assumed that they were black or were unsure about the salespeople's
race. See Peller, supra note 48, at 325 (concluding that Williams left "clear textual signals
that the reader should understand that the salespeople were white").
72. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 277.
73. If this is Tushnet's major point, however, it is unclear why he ties his discussion of her
effectiveness as a storyteller to issues of credibility.
74. See id. at 265. In addition to his explicit acknowledgment of this, Tushnet also
supports it through his discussion of Stephen Carter. Tushnet contrasts the problems he
perceives with Williams's credibility with a story he tells about Carter. Id. at 263-65. Carter
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on substantive content. Although I reject Farber and Sherry's and Tush-
net's "solutions" to the credibility problem, the probable recurrence of the
credibility issue 75 suggests that narrative scholars should confront it di-
rectly. Although we may feel insulted to have to address stated or unstated
concerns that we are fabricating, we need to recognize that our stories
challenge established pre-understandings and are thus apt to raise credibil-
ity questions for many people. As scholars, we certainly have a duty to
recount our stories accurately within the limits imposed by incomplete
perception and perspective. We should be sure to differentiate, for ex-
ample, between what someone else said or did and what their actions felt
like to US. 7 6 We should be willing to discuss with doubters the facts
surrounding our stories and to clarify elements of the stories that others
find unclear.
In addition, we might try to package our stories in ways that are less
likely to make our readers/listeners believe that our credibility is crucial to
the points we are making. 77 If a major purpose of a story is to demonstrate
or to counter pre-understanding, then by presenting the story in conjunc-
tion with other evidence demonstrating the same point, we can limit the
significance of the credibility issue. If the presentation of the story causes
many readers/listeners to recognize the story as depicting important prob-
lems, because it clarifies things they themselves have experienced, or is
packaged along with a variety of other evidence demonstrating the same
point, they should find its precise historical accuracy less significant.
Narrative scholars and our critics all should recognize that stories chal-
lenging the pre-understandings of the dominant culture will frequently
raise credibility questions. As outsiders, however, we will have a hard time
changing incorrect or overbroad pre-understandings unless we tell counter-
stories. 78 In the face of challenges to our credibility, we can aver honesty,
present stories carefully, and try to focus our critics on the significance,
rather than the credibility, of the stories. As I demonstrated earlier, much
gave an account of an event that occurred in his youth-an account that later turned out to
be false-that was given credibility by readers because it accorded with common pre-
understanding about the effects of affirmative action on African-Americans. See id. Tushnet
refers to Carter's account as "more successful" than Williams's stories because readers
found it believable. Id. at 265. The success of Carter's story suggests the difficulty of
convincing readers of the truth of accounts that contradict common pre-understanding.
75. The issue arises elsewhere in Farber and Sherry's critique and in other discussions of
storytelling. Abrams, supra note 25, at 978-79, 1020-24; Baron, supra note 4, at 92; Farber
and Sherry, supra note 1, at 808, 835-38.
76. Similarly, I agree with Farber and Sherry that we should differentiate between factual
accounts of a particular incident and composites of a number of incidents. See Farber &
Sherry, supra note 1, at 834.
77. See Abrams, supra note 25, at 994 (arguing that Martha Mahoney successfully accom-
plishes this in her writings on battered women).
78. See West, supra note 21, at 144 (arguing that women must start speaking about the
quality of their internal lives).
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productive discussion about substantive issues can ensue if readers/
listeners assume truth and continue from there. After all, lawyers do not
function entirely by determining and using "truth." Legal actors regularly
use fictional hypotheticals to further their analyses and engage in discus-
sions assuming facts to be true arguendo. Once we make good-faith efforts
to deal with concerns about credibility and civility, we should not allow
these issues to silence outsider voices.
III. CONCLUSION: MEDIATING THE PARTICULAR AND THE GENERAL IN
OUTSIDER LIVES
Farber, Sherry, and Tushnet profess to be sympathetic critics. Read
generously, their work is part of an important discussion about how to
bring outsider perspectives on law to privileged individuals most effec-
tively.79 As my discussion here and elsewhere suggests,8° I agree with
Farber and Sherry81 and Kathryn Abrams82 that simultaneously presenting
stories in the context of explicit discussion of the stories' significance and
integrating statistical evidence and traditional legal analysis may well be
the most effective way to reach a wide audience. 83 I have discovered in
teaching that hammering a point home in a number of different ways may
help the maximum number of people grasp it. Yet I am certainly open to
the idea that, in the context of extensive ongoing scholarly debate, "na-
ked" stories may connect sufficiently to the reader's existing knowledge to
reach a sizeable audience.84 Moreover, it is possible that some of the raw
79. See Delgado, supra note 17, at 666-67 (noting the difficulty outsiders have reaching
insiders). Of course, some stories are aimed only at members of the group itself. Id. at 671.
As I have noted elsewhere, narratives are very effective in building solidarity and strength
among members of a particular group. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 517-18 (citing sources); see
also CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-105 (1989)
(discussing the importance of women telling stories to one another as part of feminist
consciousness-raising); Abrams, supra note 25, at 1044 (noting that storytellers may design
narratives for this purpose). To accomplish serious change in the legal and social systems,
however, members of outgroups must convince some more privileged people to join their
cause. Thus, the question is how best to do that. This is not to say we have some sort of duty
to write and rewrite our stories until they are acceptable to the majority. Nevertheless, as a
matter of politics and demographics, it is important to talk about how best to reach people.
80. Fajer, supra note 3, at 568-70.
81. Farber & Sherry, supra note 1, at 852-54.
82. Abrams, supra note 25, at 1047-48.
83. For a particularly fine example of the integration of stories into legal scholarship, see
generally Mahoney, supra note 22. I agree with Jane Baron that connecting stories with more
traditional forms of legal analysis is not necessary for the work to be good or useful
scholarship. See Baron, supra note 48, at 30-31, 34-35. Still, such connections may be the
most effective way of reaching actors in the legal system in order to effect social change.
84. See Delgado, supra note 17, at 668-69, 670 (noting that much critical race theory is
written in more traditional scholarly styles and that very little consists of "naked" stories).
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power of narrative can be diluted by over-explanation. More discussion on
this issue would be productive.
Despite their contributions to this important discussion and their protes-
tations of friendliness, I experienced a large part of Farber and Sherry's
and Tushnet's critiques as attacks. Reading their pieces, I felt discouraged
from telling the stories of my own life and proclaiming them as truth. This
is particularly disturbing coming from Farber and Sherry, who, in a fol-
low-up piece, try to take on the mantle of defenders of truth.85 Their
reminder that truth "can take on a form of moral heroism" 8 6 is not
needed by people who daily risk jobs, the support of family and friends,
and their physical safety to truthfully discuss their sexual identities. Yet it
is these very discussions that Farber and Sherry seem to find inappropriate
in legal discourse.
As a gay man, I may be too quick to perceive this form of silencing
because one of the more important forms of pre-understanding about gay
people in our culture is that our life stories are inappropriate for public
discussion.87 We are constantly told that we should not be telling our
stories, that nobody cares who we sleep with, and that they get tired of
having us "shove" our "lifestyle" "in their faces" or "down their throats."
Farber and Sherry's rejection of first-person narratives and Tushnet's
apparent discomfort with the particularity of outsider narratives seem to
come from the same roots as these expressions of concern with gay
"flaunting." Thus, I feel a need to defend my choice to speak out openly
about my sexual identity and how it affects my experience of the world in
which I live.
At the conclusion of his article, Mark Tushnet invokes as a model of
integrity Justice Frankfurter's dissent in one of the flag salute cases, in
which the Justice dissociates himself from his Jewish heritage and con-
cludes that "as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor
agnostic."88 Tushnet applauds Frankfurter for "fighting rather than suc-
cumbing to his particularity."89 Although Tushnet seems to acknowledge
that narrative scholarship may raise different concerns than judicial opin-
85. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yirasov: Further
Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REv. 647, 655-62 (1994) (responding to
critics of their previous article, supra note 1).
86. Id. at 661.
87. See Fajer, supra note 3, at 570-607 (describing examples of the existence and costs of
the pre-understanding that gay issues are unsuitable for public discussion).
88. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 311 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 646-47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (footnote omitted).
89. Id. at 311 (footnote omitted). Ironically, as Gary Peller has noted, Frankfurter's
statement can be seen as an example of an unstated compromise by which Jews are allowed
to participate in American society if we suppress our Jewishness in public. See Peller, supra
note 48, at 340. This compromise obviously parallels gay closeting.
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ions, 90 the structure of his article suggests that he is quite concerned about
narrative scholars' overcommitment to the particular.91 This concern seems
to me misguided. In the common law system, as Tushnet himself acknowl-
edges, the relationship of the particular to the general flows both ways.92
Advocates may have to explain why a particular incident warrants a
general principle, but they often also must explain why a general principle
should not bend or yield to accommodate a particular incident to which
the general principle seems inapplicable.
Our society is filled with general principles about outsider groups that
take the form of pre-understanding. Two salient examples of this pre-
understanding come to mind. First, during 1993, the media was filled with
endless discussion, much of it quite hateful, about the propriety of allow-
ing otherwise qualified lesbians and gay men the right to serve their
country in the military.93 Second, in 1994, lesbians and gay men in several
states will have to endure statewide political battles to keep alive the
possibility of obtaining equal treatment in jobs and housing.94 The 1992
experiences in Colorado, Oregon, and Tampa suggest that these battles
will be bitter, divisive, and violent. 95 The public discourse about both of
90. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 251 n.2 (noting that his use of the term "degradation" is
appropriate for Supreme Court opinions but not for narrative scholarship); see also id. at 311
(positing that "missteps in narrative jurisprudence" might be "less important than the
Supreme Court's decision").
91. See generally id. Farber and Sherry make a similar point. See Farber and Sherry, supra
note 1, at 838-39 (noting concern that people may overly rely on atypical narratives).
92. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 255 (noting that when a particular situation arises that
challenges the response demanded by a general precedent, a precedent-oriented system can
rework the general principle).
93. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Homophobia in the Ranks, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1993, at
15 (discussing columnist's bombardment with letters from people opposed to lifting the ban
on gay people in the military); Peggy Landers, Church Petitions Oppose Gays in the Military,
MIAMI HERALD, May 21, 1993, at 6F (discussing nationwide petition sent to President
Clinton); Catherine S. Manegold, The Odd Place of Homosexuality in the Military, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at El (relating various opinions on gay people in the military); Joseph
C. Myers, Respect Opposition to Gays in the Military, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 28, 1993, at 2M
(arguing that proponents of gay people serving in the military should respect the views of
their opponents); Robert L. Steinback, Fair Compromise Still Upsets Gays, Military, MIAMI
HERALD, July 23, 1993, at lB (acknowledging that the "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue"
policy on gays in the military has upset both sides of the debate); Jill Ellen Steinberg, Why is
it Different for Men?, N.Y.TMES, May 30, 1993, at Ell (discussing differences between male
reaction to gay men and female reaction to lesbians in the context of the debate on the
military).
94. See John Gallagher, State of the Union, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 2, 1993, at 46.
95. See Bettina Boxall, Battle Lines Drawn Over Oregon's Anti-Gay Measure, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1992, at 1A (discussing effect of initiative to amend Oregon constitution to morally
condemn homosexuality); Steve Bousquet, Activist: Gay Rights Vote May Just Polarize Florida,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 26, 1993, at 5B (discussing the possibility of a vote to amend the
Florida constitution to allow discrimination against gay men and lesbians); Jana Mazanec,
Colo. Gays Say Harassment Escalating, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1992, at 3A (stating that gay
people have reported an increase in "gay bashing" since state constitutional amendment
condoning homophobic discrimination was approved).
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these issues has been filled with common pre-understanding about gay
people, particularly that we are obsessed with sex and unable to control
our desires. These "general principles" need to be challenged with specif-
ics from the quite different realities of gay life.9 6
As is true for other scholars, my sexual identity is not the sum and
substance of who I am. When I choose to emphasize it in my scholarship, I
do so not out of some random or anarchistic desire to emphasize my
particularity. I do so because that aspect of myself has been chosen as an
important characteristic by society, in ways that are largely beyond my
control; 97 and society uses that characteristic to make sweeping assump-
tions about who I am and what I am like, assumptions that permeate the
legal system that governs me. I simply do not accept that it constitutes a
failure of "integrity" or a breach of "norms of civility" for me to attempt to
explain as best I can that who I am has little to do with these assumptions.
96. See Lawrence, supra note 15, at 2247 (describing teaching methodology incorporating
narrative as follows: "The law remains, but we are always involved in testing its ability to
incorporate and respond to our experience.").
97. In a follow-up work, Farber and Sherry worry that minority communities, if not
organized around essentialist assumptions, must instead be organized around "their status
as victims." Farber & Sherry, supra note 85, at 652. They argue that organizing around
victimhood may be disempowering, may yield a frail sense of community, and may not foster
"scholarship in the sense of a reasoned search for truth." Id.
I do not see how organizing a community in order to defend against political and social
attacks and to combat harmful pre-understanding constitutes identifying on the basis of
"victimhood." Even if one accepts this characterization, the harms suggested by Farber and
Sherry do not follow. Gay people's sharing of stories that demonstrate common patterns of
oppression has forged bonds between us, empowered people to come out, and given us
strength to fight in the legal and political arenas. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 2281 n. 134
(describing storytelling as part of "active political struggle"). Moreover, a community
created by identifying and questioning pre-understanding is well situated to provide alterna-
tive stories that challenge it, thus furthering "reasoned search for truth." And I certainly do
not see attempts to provide these stories as merely "a form of group therapy." See Farber &
Sherry, supra note 85, at 652 (arguing that if the "homosexual" label is socially constructed
as a means of oppression, then in the gay community pain becomes the index of membership
and scholarship becomes less an effort to understand the world than a form of therapy).
